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November 18, 2026
· Op-Eds

Economic Independence Day

As Lebanon celebrates its 83rd Independence Day amid dire, unprecedented conditions that threaten not only the country’s territorial sovereignty but also its socio-economic stability, we see regional and global conflicts increasingly fought over energy and economic independence. So how can Lebanon find its true economic independence in the world of today and tomorrow, after having sustained such heavy economic losses in recent years?

Inspired by European and Western models, the young Lebanese state adopted a free, liberal capitalist economic system from the 1950s onward. This fostered private investment, a main economic driver for many years.

In the sixties, several state institutions were established under the mandate of President Fouad Chehab: the Central Bank, the bank secrecy law, the Code of Money and Credit, the central audit agencies, and state governance bodies such as the Civil Service Board, the National Social Security Fund, and the Higher Customs Council. In addition, the judiciary was made highly independent, competent, and efficient, increasing investor confidence. The whole system was designed to encourage private investment.

On the social level, capable men and women from modest backgrounds were encouraged to pursue higher education and to take on important roles in the private and public sectors. Lebanon witnessed the emergence of a strong middle class. Hard work was valued, and several sectors flourished during that period, including transport, tourism, banking and insurance, the arts, media and publishing, manufacturing, education, medical care, as well as agriculture and food processing. This period of economic growth and social and political prosperity stands out in Lebanon’s modern history.

The Lebanese war (1975-1990) put an end to two decades of economic prosperity. The country was split, and movement became difficult not only in the South and the Bekaa but also in the heart of a divided Beirut. Many sectors were paralyzed, and waves of emigration drove many qualified Lebanese professionals abroad. The human cost of the war was immense: an estimated 150,000 people lost their lives. Every Lebanese family lost loved ones, and decades later some families still have no news of their missing. On the economic level, per-capita GDP fell to a third of its 1974 level, while neighboring economies, mainly in the GCC, experienced exponential growth. The currency remained stable until the mid-eighties, thanks to conservative fiscal policy and responsible governance at the Central Bank.

The full economic cost of corruption and weak governance in a country like Lebanon can never be measured in full. The World Bank’s 2016 Lebanon Systematic Country Diagnostic estimated the annual cost of confessional governance at 9% of GDP1.This estimate captures the broader economic burden of the governance system; it should not be interpreted as a direct measurement of corruption alone. But does it also capture the cost of missed opportunities?

Meanwhile, even before the 2019 crisis, the informal economy employed at least 50% of Lebanon’s labour force and contributed approximately 36.4% of GDP (ILO, 2024)2. Since then, the expansion of cash transactions and untraceable economic activity has further weakened the country’s ability to collect taxes, enforce labour protections, and regulate economic activity. Seven years later, the situation remains deeply entrenched. Lebanese families increasingly depend on support from children or siblings working abroad, as the diaspora continues to prop up household budgets at home. Lebanese private businesses continue to survive on funding from their own owners, but can they grow without access to financing for investment and working capital?

The scale of the governance challenge is also reflected in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In the 2025 edition, Lebanon scored 23 out of 100 and ranked 153rd out of 182 countries. The CPI measures perceived levels of public-sector corruption rather than the actual financial cost of corruption, but Lebanon’s persistently low score underscores the urgent need to rebuild public accountability and institutional trust (Transparency International, 2026)3.

If Lebanon is serious about finding its economic footing in today’s changing world, reform must come first; financial, judicial, and social. Our political system has so far failed to deliver this, despite the urgency of the situation at every level. There is a lot to learn from the successes of the sixties and the failures of recent years.

Achieving Economic Independence will require us to reflect on the role of active citizenship in nation building at a time where our nation is under a threat to its existence and sovereignty. Rather than blindly supporting our elected members of parliament, we are called to collectively push them to accelerate the legislation and execution of financial reforms: the financial gap law, the capital control framework, the consolidation and recapitalization of banks, and the deposit recovery mechanisms recommended by the IMF, all while respecting the 1963 Code of Money and Credit, some articles of which may need modernizing. On top of that, new regulations and incentives will be needed to promote investment, build industrial capacity, and develop agriculture and the food industry. In parallel, the taxation and social security systems need to be modernized and digitized without delay. Last but not least, the judicial system must be empowered to act faster and more efficiently in judging and enforcing cases of financial crime and money laundering, with no exceptions.

Regulating the financial system, incentivizing investment in productive sectors, digitizing the taxation, customs, and social security systems, and holding financial criminals responsible for their acts are the prerequisites for Lebanon’s economic independence and sovereignty.

Hady J. NASSIF

AUB – MBA Class of 1994

Member of the Fouad Chehab Foundation

  1. Le Borgne, E., & Jacobs, T. J. (2016). Lebanon: Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity: Systematic Country Diagnostic. World Bank. The report estimates
    the cost of confessional governance at 9% of GDP annually, citing Jad Chaaban (2014), “The Costs of the Lebanese Sectarian System,” American University of
    Beirut. The 9% figure refers to the cost of confessional governance, not a direct estimate of corruption alone.
    https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/951911467995104328 ↩︎
  2. International Labour Organization (ILO). (2024). Diagnostic Analysis of Informality in Agriculture, Agri-food, and Construction. SOLIFEM. The report states that, before
    2019, the informal economy employed at least 50% of the labour force and contributed 36.4% of GDP. https://www.ilo.org/publications/diagnostic-analysis-
    informality-agriculture-agri-food-and-construction ↩︎
  3. Transparency International. (2026). Corruption Perceptions Index 2025. Lebanon scored 23/100 and ranked 153rd out of 182 countries and territories. The CPI measures
    perceived public-sector corruption, on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025 ↩︎

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