“True independence is neither taken nor given; independence is built.” – Fouad Chehab

I begin with this saying by the exemplary president, because his era was the only one that genuinely attempted to build the state of independence, before being fought by what he himself called the “cheese-eaters” (les fromagistes).

Lebanese have avoided facing this truth for more than a century. Between the proclamation of Greater Lebanon in 1920, the declaration of independence in 1943, and all the way to today, a republic emerged on paper, not on the basis of a state-building project. And the Lebanese continue to pay the price of this foundational gap until now.

After 1920, a geographic entity was assembled without constructing a shared political identity. One set of borders grouped together communities that had never agreed on a clear national contract. The Mandate did not produce a state, and the local elites failed to craft a unifying vision. Institutions were created in form, but real loyalty remained with the sect, the za‘im, and the external protector. We inherited this legacy that produced a state without a political society, and a republic without citizens.

In 1943, the moment of independence appeared as the culmination of a sovereign path, yet beneath it lay the same dilemma: a fragile elite compromise that did not address the core problem. The National Pact did not establish a social contract; it codified power-sharing rules among sectarian leaders. Independence became a political deal rather than a project of state-building. Since then, we have lived in a stumbling republic afraid to confront its postponed question: Who are we? And what state do we want?

Regional and international conditions changed, alliances shifted, but the structural nature of Lebanon’s crisis remained the same. We ask ourselves today: Why does the crisis keep reproducing itself? Because the problem does not lie in governments, but in the very idea upon which the republic was built. A state without a center of decision-making, a political system that distributes power instead of generating it, and a society where divisions are managed rather than resolved.

Every time the Lebanese tried to reform the system, reality returned them to the same starting point. From the civil war to the Taif Agreement, from Syrian withdrawal to financial collapse, the sectarian structure continued to govern every attempt at change. You see the results: paralyzed institutions, a rent-based economy, youth emigrating, and a state unable to enforce the law or protect its citizens. The original ailment persists: the absence of a national project capable of moving Lebanon from sects to a state.

Today we face a strategic question: Can the republic be rebuilt? The answer begins with political will free from external calculations, and with an internal decision that acknowledges sectarianism as a choice, not destiny. It begins when we ask ourselves: What kind of state do we

want to live in? A state of rights and citizenship, or one of clientelism and fear? A state of institutions, or a republic of deals?

Independence is built only when it becomes a daily project. When Lebanese realize that salvation does not come from abroad or from a leader, but from producing a new national contract. A contract that establishes a civil political system, frees authority from sectarian apportionment, and redefines the state as a shared space rather than divided fiefdoms.

From 1920 until today, Lebanon has lived in the shadow of a deferred republic. If we want to break this cycle, we must build a real independence this time: one made by citizens, upheld by a constitution, and defended by institutions. Only then will the republic cease to be a mirage and become a country worthy of trust.

Simon A. Kachar, PhD

Founding Director of the Good Governance and Citizenship Observatory at the Asfari Institute, and Lecturer in Political Science at the Political Science and Public Administration (PSPA) Department at AUB. Dr. Kachar holds a BA and MA in Public Administration, and a PhD in Political Science.