Lebanon today is living through a delicate transitional phase that almost summarizes more than a century of challenges and contradictory experiences. Since the proclamation of the State of the Greater Lebanon in 1920, the first independence in 1943, the Cairo Agreement of 1969, the 1975 war, the Taëf Accord of 1989, the Syrian and Israeli occupations, the second independence in 2005, the October 17 uprising, and the subsequent constitutional, political, security, economic, and suffocating financial crises, the essential question has remained suspended: What kind of state do we want? What kind of unifying national identity and national security strategy can restore Lebanon’s standing and role in its Arab environment and the international community?

The transitional features Lebanon is experiencing today are reflected first in the disintegration of the traditional system that has ruled the country for decades. The entrenched political class has begun to lose its popular legitimacy; hijacked constitutional institutions have decayed under the weight of sectarian quotas and corruption; the economy has collapsed under rentier, clientelist, and sectarian policies; while Lebanese society is either emigrating or fragmenting between sectarian and partisan loyalties. On the other hand, there emerges a renewed civil and state movement demanding a sovereign, free, just, and independent state, where sectarian, denominational, or regional affiliation is not the measure of national identity, but rather rights and duties within the framework of the state of law and constitution—where no legitimacy exists above the state, where there is one decision, one army, and one authority. This new awareness, despite its organizational weakness, is accompanied by a new presidential term and a foundational government with both sovereign and reformist dimensions, offering a glimpse of hope that Lebanon has entered a new structural phase. This phase is based on a social contract redefining the relationship between the citizen and the state, grounded in citizenship that embraces diversity.

The deeper dilemma in Lebanon lies not only in fragmented sovereignty, institutionalized corruption, or poor governance, but in the absence of citizenship as a unifying national identity. The Lebanese citizen finds himself belonging first to his sect or his party, while the state retreats to a nominal umbrella distributing benefits rather than protecting rights. This structural flaw has produced accumulated crises, widened sectarian polarization, paralyzed institutions at every juncture, and entrenched the practice of calling upon foreign powers to resolve internal disputes. It has also solidified the logic of non-state actors or leaders above the state. From here, Lebanon’s national security is threatened not only by external factors but internally as well. National security cannot be built without a strong unifying national identity that rallies the Lebanese behind the State. Citizenship is not merely a slogan; it is a national security strategy. It defines who is responsible for decisions of war and peace, allies, adversaries, and enemies. It ensures that arms remain the exclusive right of legitimate institutions, while also upholding good governance, accountability, transparency, and the sound management of resources for the common good. It is what shields Lebanon against fragmentation and chaos.

Lebanon, which once was a hub for Arab and international dialogue, has lost much of its weight due to external dependencies and internal conflicts. Yet regaining this role is not a distant dream but a strategic option tied to the state’s ability to formulate a clear foreign policy based on positive neutrality, one that refrains from engaging in conflicting regional or international axes, while maintaining Lebanon’s commitment to just Arab and international causes. This can serve as an entry point for reintegrating Lebanon into the global diplomatic map. Instead of being a battlefield, it can become a space of encounter and balance. Positive neutrality is not withdrawal from engagement but a smart positioning that guarantees Lebanon’s internal stability and restores the trust of the international and Arab community in it as a partner in global peace and security.

The vision for the future begins with restoring the state’s sovereign function in decisions of war and peace and the monopoly of arms. No talk of economic reform, combating corruption, or attracting investment is possible without a state that owns its decision and enforces its authority over its entire territory. A strong state is one that protects its citizens, not one that seeks protection from them. It is the state that unifies the army and security forces as the sole guarantor of security, not one that leaves arms spread among groups and factions. From this perspective, the Lebanese government’s decision of August 5 and 7 is pivotal.

At the same time, building Lebanon’s future requires restoring the structure of the social contract that unites the components of the Lebanese people through political reform expressed in a fair electoral law, an independent judiciary, and an efficient public administration free of sectarian quotas. These pillars are not slogans but existential conditions. Without them, Lebanon remains a fragile entity vulnerable to repeated collapse or continuous fragmentation.

Lebanon stands at a crossroads. Either it remains hostage to internal divisions and external tug-of-war, or it takes firm steps toward building a modern national state. A unifying national identity is not a luxury but a prerequisite for national security. Positive neutrality is not an illusion but an opportunity to stabilize Lebanon and reconnect it with its Arab environment and the international community. The possible Lebanon is Lebanon the State: a sovereign, free, just, and independent state; the state of citizenship and law; a state of peace and prosperity. The road may be long and arduous, but the alternative is continued collapse and the explosion of the entity itself. Between the state and the non-state, the compass is clear: the return to the constitution.

Ziad El Sayegh, PhD

Ziad El Sayegh is a Senior International Fellow at the Asfari Institute for Civil Society and Citizenship and the Executive Director of the Civic Influence Hub