In Lebanon, a country where the state is contested by forces with multiple loyalties, and where the local intersects with the regional, and the religious with the political, discussions of good governance are not academic luxuries or tired slogans. Rather, they are a national existential necessity and a sovereign imperative, before being an administrative reform. The Lebanese state is threatened by fragmentation and collapse. It cannot survive without a national compass that restores the meaning of legitimacy, order, and independent policy-making. This new phase in Lebanon’s political journey brings with it hopeful prospects, despite the significant obstacles. 

The Lebanese uprising of October 2019 marked a pivotal moment, not only as a mass protest against corruption, impoverishment, and systemic decline, but because it revealed a complete collapse of trust between citizens and their state. The Lebanese citizens no longer trust the fairness of public administration, the transparency of institutions, the integrity of political leadership, or the legitimacy of the public order. This crisis cannot be resolved through political balancing acts or temporary deals; it requires a comprehensive project to rebuild the state through sovereign good governance, one that reaffirms national sovereignty and redefines the social contract, rooted in the constitution and based on a model of citizenship that embraces diversity. 

As defined by international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations, good governance is an administrative system built on the principles of transparency, accountability, the rule of law, participation, justice, and effectiveness. However, in the Lebanese context, these principles must be organically intertwined with the principle of sovereignty. Governance, divorced from a national security and sovereignty framework and conducted under the influence of de facto powers or foreign interventions, yields a submissive administration, not a free and independent state. Therefore, good governance in Lebanon is impossible without being sovereign, free from external dictates, grounded in an independent national will, and embodied in institutions that represent society, not merely its sectarian groups or political factions. 

Lebanon’s crisis is not merely economic or financial, nor is it limited to corruption and mismanagement. It is a crisis of political behavior entrenched in sectarianism, the sharing of power among political elites, and the subjugation of public decisions to narrow group interests. Unless this structural flaw at the core of the political system is addressed, any administrative or technical reforms will remain superficial and ineffective. How can transparency be achieved when public administration is tailored to serve political loyalties? How can accountability exist in a system that prioritizes sectarian immunities over legal responsibility? How can oversight bodies operate when they are beholden to political interference? And how can institutions function under the duality of arms and decision-making? 

If sovereign good governance is to be built in Lebanon, it must be grounded in citizenship, not clientelism; in competence, not sectarian affiliation; and in the rule of law, not partisan whims. This model of governance requires, first and foremost, full judicial independence, not just in legislation but in practice, so that judges are shielded from political pressure, empowered to hold the corrupt accountable, and capable of resolving disputes impartially. It also requires liberating the public administration from political patronage through transparent mechanisms for recruitment and appointments, the establishment of effective inspection bodies, the activation of the Court of Audit, and the protection of oversight institutions from interference or obstruction. 

Good governance also necessitates reforming the tax system to make it an instrument of social justice rather than a burden on the most vulnerable. It is unacceptable for indirect taxes to remain the primary source of public revenue while the state’s rights are squandered by monopolists and tax evaders. Governance cannot be separated from balanced development that addresses regional disparities, ensures equal infrastructure across regions, and combats marginalization, which feeds resentment and division. 

Yet the deepest challenge facing this vision lies not only in policy design, but in the state’s ability to reclaim its sovereign decision-making power. A state that does not control its borders, lacks the monopoly over legitimate force, and cannot determine its foreign policy independently of regional polarization is a state incapable of practicing good governance. In fact, it is a state that has lost its sovereign character and thus its foundational legitimacy as a unifying civil authority. Therefore, any project for good governance in Lebanon must go hand-in-hand with the enforcement of the state’s exclusive right to arms through the army and legitimate security forces, the unification of military and security decision-making, the control of border crossings, and the neutralization of Lebanon from regional conflicts. 

At the same time, the economic decision-making process must be liberated from the grip of special interest groups that have dominated state resources through banks, monopolistic companies, and suspicious public contracts. Restoring economic sovereignty begins with fiscal policy reform, halting the political misuse of public debt, and restructuring the banking sector according to fair and transparent standards that protect depositors’ funds and re-establish the central bank’s role as an independent institution subject to legal accountability, not political loyalty. 

Good governance cannot be achieved without the active participation of citizens and civil society in oversight and decision-making. In recent years, Lebanese society has demonstrated remarkable vitality, generating effective civic initiatives, speaking out against corruption and abuse, and at times proposing viable alternatives. This social energy must not remain confined to protest, it should be integrated into formal decision-making through advisory councils, participatory processes, and local mechanisms for dialogue and development. 

Perhaps the greatest challenge of all is rebuilding trust. The Lebanese people, repeatedly betrayed by their leaders and stripped of their savings and livelihoods, have grown deeply skeptical of reform promises. Thus, restoring trust must begin with symbolic but impactful steps: public accountability for offenders, full disclosure of the state’s financial records, enforcement of the Access to Information Law, and the suspension of appointments and contracts that entrench clientelism. 

Lebanon has no alternative but to transform into a modern civic state grounded in citizenship, sovereign good governance, and full independence. Piecemeal fixes and temporary settlements have failed, and power-sharing arrangements based on dividing spoils have proven ineffective. What is needed is a national revival project that ends the era of political sectarianism and lays the groundwork for a social contract based on the constitution, where institutions are built on merit and integrity, and sovereignty is protected from all forms of dependency. This is not the responsibility of one generation alone, but a shared duty among citizens, intellectuals, civil society, and free press. Only a political will born from deep societal awareness can restore Lebanon as a state of law, justice, and freedom. 

Ziad El Sayegh, PhD

Ziad El Sayegh is a Senior International Fellow at the Asfari Institute for Civil Society and Citizenship and the Executive Director of the Civic Influence Hub