As Lebanon’s socioeconomic situation continues to deteriorate, the country’s ruling political class has chosen to escalate its hate and scapegoating rhetoric against Syrian refugees, as opposed to finding alternatives to the current trends of policymaking. Traditional political parties have largely agreed and reached a consensus in favor of the idea of forcibly deporting refugees, despite ample information

Recently, a campaign was launched that directly targeted the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s office in Lebanon. Earlier in October, Secretary General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah accused the organization of having too much power, while others such as the Strong Republic Bloc and Mufti Sheikh Ahmed Qabalan have called for the closing of the UNHCR’s doors.

Throughout 2023, the Lebanese Army has undertaken several raids on refugee-hosting areas and has indeed deported a large number of refugees, often in coordination with the Syrian armed forces. Violent incidents such as groups of men beating Syrian refugees and the mass evictions of refugees via camp burnings have concerningly increased throughout the last 4 years. With the recent data-sharing agreement between the Lebanese Government and the UNHCR, the prospects of the government’s aims to use such data don’t bode well for refugees in the country.

Hate with No Strategy

The latest incitement campaigns by ruling-class parties in Lebanon and traditional mainstream media to incite violence against refugees can be described as propagating “hate with no strategy”.

What this description refers to is the fact that while politicians have tried to blame refugees for the crisis, have claimed that they were on course to change the country’s demographic landscape, and have labeled refugee influxes as an existential crisis, they have still not proposed any adequate plans for both the displacement crisis itself and the country’s socioeconomic crisis in general.

Meetings with Syrian government counterparts have so far led nowhere with reluctance on the latter’s part when it comes to welcoming refugees back. Claims that Syria is now safe for return have repeatedly been proven false by human rights organizations documenting the torture, imprisonment, and army enlistment that returnees are subjected to. In addition, the conflation of the network of smugglers and terrorists with refugees is further blurring any attempts towards concrete policymaking.

So far, authorities have relied on ad-hoc measures with no structural or inclusive policy considerations. The measures are mostly restrictive on refugees, such as municipalities imposing curfews and recommending strict implementation of circulars related to Syrian displacement. The Ministry of Industry released a circular against illegal Syrian work and threatened to punish any industry that hires workers with no legal documents, while the Ministry of Education and Higher Education refuted merging displaced students with Lebanese ones.

Inclusive and Evidence-Based Policymaking

While the above measures restrict Syrian refugees’ mobility and livelihood opportunities in Lebanon, they still did not offer any solution to the crisis let alone look for any inclusive alternatives. They have failed at fulfilling the wishes of the ruling class in absolving themselves in the public eye of responsibility, but they have also failed on economic, human rights, and social justice levels. In addition, they have failed to demonstrate how the Lebanese population stands to benefit from such measures.

Indeed, Lebanon lacks any strategy for socioeconomic recovery. For the government’s revenue-generating attempts, the lack of confidence in its ruling class has exasperated a shrinking donor landscape, the attempts at drilling for gas have failed and the taxation system remains inequitable and inefficient. On the spending side, social policies have increasingly marginalized productive sectors such as agriculture and industry and the education sector in favor of a rentier, unproductive, and favoritist economic system. Social protection policies have been largely fragmented and lacking in sustainable groundings, not to mention often excluding women and marginalized groups who are often in need of such interventions.

As such, looking for inclusive and sustainable alternatives vis-à-vis Syrian refugee influxes is not only a human rights matter, it is also a strategic socioeconomic one. A brief look at the history of Syrian contribution to the Lebanese economy is enough to inspire inclusive alternatives to the current policymaking trends.

The agri-food sector remains one area where Syrians have historically contributed and have been historically exploited for cheap labor, and where potentials for improving Lebanon’s import-export dynamics remain great despite historical neglect. The boosting of local industry is another area where host communities, refugees, and the country’s overall economy can benefit.

So far, non-governmental organizations have taken the lead in providing aid and assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon, 90% of whom are not able to provide basic needs. But such aid has significantly dwindled throughout the last few years and the Lebanese government has excluded refugees from its social protection programs. While often demonized by mainstream political parties and media, it’s important to note that aid programs that have hitherto supported refugees have often been implemented following careful consideration of social tensions and have also benefitted host communities and the country’s economy as a whole from the influx of foreign currency.

Looking for a positive solution for all concerned parties, especially those who have been historically marginalized by governmental and societal actors, is rooted not in evidence-less populism, but in an inclusive, evidence-based, and sustainable lens for strategizing, lest violent discourses capitalize on the fall of a dying regime.

Marwan Issa

Writer and researcher specializing in socio-political analysis with a focus on Lebanon, the Middle East, and Arab-European Development Initiatives. Previous areas of work include research on social movements in Lebanon and the Arab region, humanitarian aid, refugee socioeconomic realities, and clientelism by Lebanese political parties.