Lebanon’s recurring calls for a revisiting the social contract are not novel, but I advocate for a genuine agreement between the Lebanese people and their state. Classical social contract theory (Hobbes, 1651; Locke, 1689; Rousseau, 1762) posits a reciprocal relationship between governed and government, where rights and obligations are mutually defined. In functioning democracies, this translates to security, welfare, representation, and participation. Lebanon, however, lacks this fundamental framework. Rather than fostering a cohesive national identity anchored in citizenship, Lebanon operates under a fragmented sectarian system where the primary political contract is between the state and sectarian groups, not between the state and its citizens.  

The Conceptual Void 

A social contract presupposes a direct and reciprocal relationship between the state and its citizens. This relationship is built on the state’s provision of security, justice, services, and welfare in exchange for the citizens’ allegiance, participation, and compliance with laws (Gauthier, 1986). In countries where the social contract is robust, such as France and the Nordic states, the state operates as the primary guarantor of rights and services, fostering a strong sense of national identity and civic responsibility (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The social contract is not merely a theoretical construct; it is an institutional and cultural framework that underpins governance, social cohesion, and economic development. 

Lebanon presents a stark contrast to such models. The importance of a social contract can be observed in countries that have successfully navigated diverse societies and political challenges. For example, Scandinavian welfare states have demonstrated how strong social contracts can promote economic stability, social equality, and public trust in government institutions. Even in South Africa post-apartheid, the constitution established a new social contract based on equality, human rights, and democratic participation, which has been critical in fostering national reconciliation and social cohesion (Habib, 2013). These examples illustrate that a robust social contract can serve as the foundation for inclusive governance and national unity. 

This fundamental link is distorted in Lebanon, where the state’s legitimacy and authority are not derived from a unified citizenry but from sectarian power structures that act as intermediaries, effectively displacing the state as the central actor in the social contract (Salamey, 2014). Built on the National Pact of 1943 and the Taif Agreement’s principles, Lebanon’s political framework is based on consociationalism, where power is distributed among religious sects rather than through democratic representation rooted in citizenship (Lijphart, 1969). This arrangement inherently contradicts the principles of a social contract, as it fosters allegiance to sectarian identities over national belonging. Instead of serving all citizens equally, the state functions as a mediator among sectarian groups, which control political representation, social services, and economic opportunities. This system not only weakens the state’s authority but also deprives citizens of direct engagement with state institutions, reinforcing political disenfranchisement and social fragmentation. The tenuous relationship between citizens and the state highlights the systemic neglect of citizenship as a binding national principle. 

The Displacement of Citizenship 

Citizenship is the cornerstone of the social contract, providing individuals with legal protections, access to public goods, and political representation based on universal principles rather than communal affiliations (Habermas, 1996). At the core of Lebanon’s socio-political dysfunction is the absence of a cohesive concept of citizenship. If citizenship embodies equal rights, responsibilities, and participation in the political and social spheres, these rights and responsibilities are fragmented along sectarian lines in Lebanon. 

The Lebanese state operates within a framework that neglects these foundational principles. This was not an accidental development but rather a structural feature of the political system. The state does not function as an impartial guarantor of rights and services; instead, these functions are often outsourced to sectarian groups that operate parallel to or even in competition with the state (Cammett, 2014). The state ends up acting not as a direct provider of services to citizens but as a guarantor of the rights of, and mediator between, sectarian groups. 

The displacement of citizenship manifests in several ways. Firstly, access to social services, employment opportunities, and legal protections is often contingent upon sectarian networks rather than state institutions. As a result, individuals are forced to rely on their sectarian affiliations to secure basic needs, undermining their role as equal citizens under a single, national framework (Leenders, 2012). Political elites have established a system of clientelism where the state is treated as a privilege for leaders and their factions, and the public seems to have accepted or embraced it, as evidenced by the repetitive results of parliamentary elections. 

Secondly, citizens, whether voluntarily or not, interact with the state primarily through their communal affiliations. It has become easier to go through political leaders to secure what the state can offer rather than engage directly with state institutions. This dynamic extends beyond securing services; it influences attitudes toward civic responsibilities such as paying taxes, obeying laws, and participating in governance. This detachment is facilitated by the political apathy described by Gramsci, where citizens, feeling that the system is unresponsive and corrupt, withdraw from participation. This collective resignation benefits the ruling elite by weakening forces for change. Disappointment becomes a tool of control, suppressing effective social initiatives. Lebanon suffers from a ruinous citizenship deficit (Nabatchi 2018). 

The Erosion of State Legitimacy 

The legitimacy of a state in a social contract framework is derived from its ability to represent and serve all its citizens equally (Beetham, 1991). In Lebanon, the state’s legitimacy is perpetually in crisis because it does not function as a neutral arbiter or universal provider. The reliance on sectarian power brokers for governance and service provision creates a fragmented political landscape where the state’s role is diminished. 

One could argue that a weak state is simply unprepared to fulfill these responsibilities. However, Lebanon’s failure is not merely administrative or institutional but conceptual, rooted in a political system that does not recognize a unified citizenry as the foundation of its authority. This dynamic fosters widespread political apathy, where citizens feel alienated from the state and disengaged from formal political processes. The political apathy described by Gramsci (1971) serves as a tool of control, allowing entrenched elites to maintain power by suppressing effective social initiatives and reformist movements. The state’s failure is not solely the responsibility of the government; the Lebanese people must also acknowledge their role in sustaining this system. There is no clear understanding of what the state needs from its citizens. The state is expected to provide services, enforce laws, and ensure stability, but there is little discussion about what citizens must contribute in return. This creates a one-sided social contract: a state that is expected to deliver but not one that is reciprocally supported by its citizens. 

Conclusion 

Calls to redefine Lebanon’s existing social contract are often more political than structural, centered on how different confessional groups wish to redistribute power within the system rather than on fostering genuine national unity. While systemic reform is a daunting challenge, persistent demands for change—evidenced by widespread protests and civil activism—signal a collective aspiration for a reimagined social contract. The 2019 October protests and the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut port explosion epitomized the citizens’ disillusionment with Lebanon’s dysfunctional system. Recent political developments, including efforts to form a new government, highlight a growing demand for reform. 

However, rebuilding the social contract in Lebanon requires more than political negotiations between sectarian groups. It demands a fundamental shift in political culture and a process of individual self-reflection. Every Lebanese citizen must ask: What kind of relationship do I want with the state? What do I expect from the state? And what am I willing to contribute in return? This introspective approach is arguably more challenging than a national dialogue between political and religious leaders. The real question remains: Are the Lebanese people prepared to take on this task and confront these hard truths? The answer is far from clear. 

Khaldoun AbouAssi, Ph.D. 

Professor Khaldoun AbouAssi is the Provost Associate Professor at the Department of Public Administration & Policy and Distinguished Senior International Fellow at the Asfari Institute for Civil Society and Citizenship, American University of Beirut. Prof. AbouAssi’s primary research interest is in global governance, especially the governance of refugee camps, exploring different facets of public and nonprofit management, and delving into organizational capacity- broadly defined. Prof. AbouAssi has published extensively on nonprofit and public management from a comparative perspective, examining organizational capacity, resources, and inter-organizational relations..