Lebanon 2026: Toward the Constitutionalizing of the State!

Lebanon entered 2025 burdened by a comprehensive collapse that can no longer be reduced to accumulated financial, economic, or social crises. Rather, it revealed itself in its full reality as a crisis of sovereign reform and reformist sovereignty par excellence. This year demonstrated, beyond any doubt, that the prevailing dysfunction no longer stems from mismanagement or weak public policies, but from a systematic suspension of the constitutional text, the transformation of exception into rule, and the reduction of the Constitution to a selective reference, invoked when convenient and ignored when binding, until it was even claimed that it must “Adapt to Circumstances.” Adaptation, in this sense, is destruction and complicity.

At the beginning of 2025, a process was launched to halt the emptying of the First Presidency, to end the duality of sovereign decision-making, and to restore cohesion between state and society. Domestic and international confidence expanded in the ability of institutions to resume their functions, following the formation of a government possessing, at a minimum, the attributes of reform and sovereignty. Yet the failure of the legislative authority, the paralysis of parliamentary oversight, and the weak regularity of governmental action, despite the adoption of remedial options, have all pointed to the fragility of the parliamentary democratic system, as the very core of the constitutional contract. In parallel, public services became arenas of depletion, social inequality deepened, forced migration of skilled professionals expanded, societal resilience weakened, and the image of the state deteriorated, from a guarantor of rights into a producer of deprivation.

However, 2025 was not merely a year of attempted policy adjustment; it was also a year of ultimate exposure. Either a return to the Constitution as a comprehensive sovereign-reformist reference, or a slide toward the disintegration of the state and the transformation of the entity into a fragile, unregulated space devoid of horizon. Accordingly, 2026 must not be read as a mere technical extension of time, but as a foundational phase for rebuilding the constitutional state. This is not pessimistic diagnosis, but a positioning grounded in constructive pragmatism. If 2025 signaled the promise of a sovereign, free, just, and independent State of Citizenship, then 2026 must be the year of constitutional, sovereign, political, and reformist realization, paving the way for an orderly transition toward full state constitutionalism.

The first challenge is, by excellence, constitutional. Restoring the constitutional text as a binding reference, immune to suspension, selective interpretation, or the pretext of “Appropriate Timing.” This requires the regular functioning of constitutional institutions, respect for constitutional deadlines, shielding the state from the logic of deals at the expense of rules, and activating the Constitutional Council to act as a guardian of the text, not as a seasonal body. It also necessitates reaffirming the principle of separation and balance of powers and revitalizing parliamentary oversight over government as the essence of the parliamentary democratic system.

From here, the 2026 parliamentary elections acquire a structural dimension. In their aftermath, and with the possibility of forming a sovereign-reformist majority, a functional government must emerge to launch the implementation of the Taif Agreement’s reform provisions, from establishing the National Commission for the Abolition of Political Sectarianism (Article 95), to enforcing expanded administrative decentralization, creating a Senate, drafting a modern, representative, and fair electoral law, ensuring judicial independence, and restoring constitutional interpretation to the Constitutional Council. This alone marks the true beginning of state course correction.

The sovereignty challenge remains the cornerstone of any serious reform path. No constitutional state can exist amid multiple arms, nor can financial, economic, or social reform proceed without the final and complete monopoly of arms by the state. Reformist sovereignty means that sovereignty is not a political slogan but a constitutional function that mandates unity of security and military decision-making and prevents dual references in war and peace. It also entails building a national security policy under civilian authority, alongside a foreign policy aligned with the supreme national interest and the human security of the Lebanese people.

On the financial challenge, 2026 must mark the transition from loss management to achievable financial reform, adopting a realistic and transparent budget; reforming revenue collection to curb evasion and ensure tax justice; rationalizing expenditure according to social and developmental priorities; and restructuring public debt in a way that prevents transferring the crisis to future generations. Parallel to this is a fair approach to depositors’ rights, preventing injustice from being normalized as a “Final Reality,” through an in-depth debate on the so-called “financial gap law.” This must be accompanied by rebuilding the banking sector on principles of governance and accountability, closing channels of political rent-seeking in public contracts, and linking public spending to measurable performance indicators, away from patchwork and short-term fixes.

Economically and socially, the challenge lies in shifting from an economy of collapse to a productive, integrated economy with services. This requires supporting productive sectors, protecting competition, modernizing investment laws, and rehabilitating infrastructure,

particularly electricity, water, ports, and telecommunications, to reduce business costs, raise productivity, and unlock growth. In parallel, a sustainable social safety net must be established, linked to a transparent national database, with effective health and education protection programs. Poverty is not merely a statistic; it is a direct threat to civil peace and to rebuilding trust between citizens and the state.

Legally and judicially, there can be no constitutionalism without an independent and effective judiciary. Liberating the judiciary from political interference, modernizing appointment mechanisms based on competence, strengthening judicial inspection, enacting legislation to combat corruption and protect whistleblowers, and activating administrative and financial oversight platforms are all foundational requirements of justice. Moreover, unveiling the indictment in the Beirut Port explosion case constitutes a decisive test of the rule of law, as judicial truth is an integral part of national security and of people’s right to justice and redress.

Educationally and academically, no revival is possible without rebuilding the school and the university as incubators of citizenship and critical thinking. Advancing public education in coordinated integration with the private sector, consolidating quality standards, updating curricula to reinforce constitutional culture and education on rights, duties, and freedoms, and launching research partnerships that generate actionable policy knowledge are urgent imperatives that tolerate neither delay nor compromise. Education must be linked to the labor market and the knowledge economy, as the emigration of talent is a sovereign hemorrhage that weakens Lebanon’s capacity for renewal and deprives it of its human capital, the backbone of its entity and its core comparative advantage.

Diplomatically, Lebanon needs to redefine its foreign policy within a framework of positive neutrality, a neutrality that shields the state from becoming an arena, establishes a peace-making role, rests on international and Arab legitimacy, and restores relations based on mutual interests and respect for sovereignty. Within this path, economic diplomacy becomes essential to attract investment and integrate Lebanon into regional and international cooperation tracks, while reaffirming the state’s exclusive authority in negotiations and in managing border files and sovereign resources.

Amid all this, the 2026 parliamentary elections emerge as a decisive gateway to forming a new majority that revitalizes the parliamentary democratic system, enables the formation of an execution-capable government, and reactivates accountability. Any attempt to postpone or dilute the elections under any pretext constitutes an assault on the Constitution and on citizens’ rights, allowing the ruling system to regenerate itself malignantly. The success of the electoral process requires an independent electoral administration, guarantees of integrity, and the effective empowerment of the diaspora as a full partner in national policy-making.

Ultimately, all the above acquires meaning only by leading Lebanon, starting in 2026, toward a constitutional state, through the formulation of a clear national security policy that integrates sovereignty with human security. State security is inseparable from citizens’ safety. Sovereignty is not limited to arms monopoly alone; it is measured by the state’s ability to protect the lives, rights, dignity, and future of its people. The desired national security policy must link military, economic, social, food, environmental, energy, and diplomatic security within an integrated vision that restores the state’s core functions and achieves synergy between sovereign reform and the sovereignty of reform.

Lebanon 2026 is not a date on a calendar; it is an appointment with a clear constitutional, sovereign, and political choice. Either a state that restores its Constitution, institutions, and civilizational role, or an entity managed on the margins of history. The decision, for the last time, lies in the hands of the Lebanese people. It is the final opportunity for a promising tomorrow.